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PRESENT PERPETUATION OF PAST DISCRIMINATION:
EMPLOYMENT SENIORITY SYSTEMS AS A
CONTINUING VIOLATION UNDER TITLE VII-
EFFECT ON ITS STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
Evans v. United Air Lines, Inc.,
534 F.2d 1247 (7th Cir.),
cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 308 (1976) (No. 76-333)
Seniority systems have long been relied upon by employers and employ-
ees to determine allocation of the benefits, rights and compensation of
employment. Seniority systems are especially favored by employees because
the systems are capable of objective application:1 greater benefits and security
of employment are accorded members with the longest time in service, while
junior members enjoy fewer options on the job and run a greater risk of layoff.
Despite this presumed objectivity, seniority systems may nevertheless
operate to discriminate against employees in violation of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.2 Title VII outlaws job-related discrimination based on an
employee's race, color, sex, religion, or national origin.3 Under Title VII,
facially neutral employment practices 4 have been found unlawful if their
current operation perpetuates the effects of past discrimination. 5 Aggrieved
1. Cooper & Sobol, Seniority and Testing Under Fair Employment Laws: A General
Approach to Objective Criteria of Hiring and Promotion, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1598, 1602 (1969).
2. Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1970 & Supp. IV 1974),
as amended by the Equal Employment Opportunity act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103
[hereinafter cited in the text as Title VII or the Act].
3. Section 703(a) of the Act provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, condi-
tions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1970 & Supp. IV 1974). Sections 2000e-2 (b) and (c) cover similar
prohibitions against discrimination by employment agencies and labor unions.
4. A "facially neutral" employment act or practice does not discriminate per seas to race,
color, sex, religion, or national origin. Winslow, Sex Discrimination in Employment: Current
Federal Practice, 24 DRAKE L. REV. 515, 518-21 (1975); see generally, Developments in the Law,
Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the CivilRights Act of 1964,84 HARV. L. REV. 1109
(1971).
5. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co.. 401 U.S. 424. 430 (1971).
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employees have consistently applied this theory of present perpetuation of
past discrimination in challenging "departmental" seniority systems. 6
A departmental seniority system regulates promotions, transfer, and
seniority with reference to time served in a particular department rather than
from date of hire.7 Such a system may, for example, permit transfer to another
department only with forfeiture of seniority earned in the present department.
The employee then starts re-earning seniority based only on the amount of
time worked in the new position. Even where past discriminatory restrictions
against transfer are removed, the system locks employees in particular
departments which were, prior to Title VII, deliberately segregated by race,
sex, or otherwise. Thus, the discriminatory status quo is maintained in two
ways. First, the forfeiture of seniority upon transferring acts as a deterrent to
transfer to the better jobs. Second, if minority employees do choose to
transfer, they will never attain the status they would have reached in the new
department had their transfer not been delayed by earlier discriminatory
restrictions.8 The circuit courts of appeals have found that departmental
seniority systems which operate in this manner, even though non-
discriminatory on their face, perpetuate the effects of past discrimination and
have held such systems violative of Title VII. 9
6. E.g., Gilmore v. Kansas City Terminal Ry. Co., 509 F.2d 48 (8th Cir. 1975); Rich v.
Martin Marietta Corp., 522 F.2d 333 (10th Cir. 1975); Resendis v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc.,
505 F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 96 S.Ct. 2201 (1975); United States v. Bethlehem Steel
Corp., 446 F.2d 652 (2d Cir. 1971); Jones v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 431 F.2d 245 (10th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 954 (1971); Local 189, United Papermakers & Paperworkers v.
United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970); Quarles v. Philip
Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968) (the leading case which struck down a
departmental seniority system which operated to continue earlier discriminatory employment
practices). A defense to the maintenance of a discriminatory departmental seniority system
exists when the system functions for a legitimate business purpose, one which is "sufficiently
compelling to override any discriminatory racial impact. . . . [T]here must be available no
acceptable alternative policies or practices which would . . . accomplish it equally well with a
lesser differential impact." Robinson v. Lorrillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir.), cert.
dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971). See also Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,431 (1971);
Note, Business Necessity Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: A No-Alternative
Approach, 84 YALE L.J. 98 (1964). Lack of intent to discriminate does not protect an employment
practice from being violative of Title VII. The practice need only be deliberate and not accidental.
Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 796-97 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 100 (197 1);
Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1201 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991
(1971).
7. Local 189, United Papermakers & Paperworkers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980, 984
(5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970).
8. United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652, 658 (2d Cir. 1971).
9. E.g., Palmer v. General Mills, Inc., 513 F.2d 1040(6th Cir. 1975); United States v. N. L.
Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354 (8th Cir. 1973); United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652
(2d Cir. 1971); Jones v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 431 F.2d 245 (10th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
401 U.S. 954 (1971); Local 189, United Papermakers & Paperworkers v. United States, 416 F.2d
980 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970).
A remedy courts have established for discrimination stemming from the operation of a
departmental seniority system is that of imposing plant-wide, or employment, seniority. This
remedy is designed to put the discriminatee in the place close to where he or she would have been
were it not for the past unfair employment practice. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 495 F.2d
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Employees have also sought to apply this theory of "present perpetua-
tion" to company-wide, or "employment," seniority systems. An employ-
ment seniority system measures seniority on a company-wide basis from the
date of employment by taking into account the total time the employee has
worked for the employer. 10 Employees under an employment seniority
system face different problems than those under departmental seniority
systems. Present workers under an employment seniority system who were
once discriminatorily denied employment have relatively lesser seniority than
those who were properly hired. Because of their low seniority status, they are
entitled to fewer benefits and are much more vulnerable to layoff than had
they not been previously refused hire. Therefore, it is argued that the seniority
system operates to perpetuate past discrimination by crediting such an
employee with lesser seniority than had the individual not been previously
discriminated against. 11
The perpetuation theory has not commonly been applied to challenges to
employment seniority systems because of the belief by some courts that these
neutral systems were bona fide and therefore protected from suit under Title
VII. 12 That belief is no longer valid. However, a separate consideration that
remains viable and significant is that a suit based upon the operation of an
employment seniority system may ineffectuate the Act's statute of limita-
tions. This is possible in two ways. First, a suit based upon the operation of an
employment seniority system focuses on that present system, rather than on
the earlier discrimination which is allegedly perpetuated. A plaintiff thus may
be permitted to circumvent the limitations period for bringing suit on the
original discrimination. Second, a complaint which focuses on the present
seniority system raises uncertainties about the proper application of the
limitations period to that alleged violation.
In a recent case of first impression in the United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit, a challenge to the operation of an employment
seniority system was sustained upon the theory of present perpetuation of past
398, 416-17 (5th Cir. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 424 U.S. 747 (1976); United States v. N. L.
Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 375 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d
652, 665 (2d Cir. 1971). Courts may of course order payment of backpay. See Note, Standards
Governing Backpay A wards for Violation of Title VII of the CivilRights Act of 1964,61 CORNELL
L. REV. 460 (1976).
10. Note, The Problem of Last Hired, First Fired: Retroactive Seniority Asa Remedy Under
Title VII, 9 GA. L. REV. 611, 612 (1975).
11. E.g., Jersey Central Power & Light Co. v. Local 327, IBEW, 508 F.2d 687,706 (3d Cir.
1975), vacated and remanded sub nom. EEOC v. Jersey Central Power & Light Co., 96 S. Ct.
2196 (1976).
12. Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works, 502 F.2d 1309(7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 96S. Ct.
2214 (1976); Jersey Central Power & Light Co. v. Local 327, IBEW, 508 F.2d 687 (3d Cir. 1975),
vacated and remanded sub nom. EEOC v. Jersey Central Power & Light Co., 96 S. Ct. 21%
(1976); Watkins v. United Steel Workers Local 2369, 516 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1975).
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discrimination. In Evans v. UnitedAirLines, Inc., 13 the Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit relied upon a recent United States Supreme Court
decision 4 and held that employment seniority systems are not protected from
suit even though they may be neutral and presumably bona fide. 15 Evans then
applied the perpetuation theory and held that an employment seniority system
could operate to continue past discrimnation and thus violate Title VII. 16
Evans involved an employee who was rehired several years after a 1968
discriminatory discharge. The employer's employment seniority system
credited only continuous time-in-service. Accordingly, the employee was not
credited with time worked before the discriminatory discharge. Plaintiff
based her complaint on the present operation of the employment seniority
system rather than on the prior 1968 discriminatory termination, a claim
which was time-barred under the Act.' 7 Therefore, although suit upon the
discharge itself was time-barred, the plaintiff was given another opportunity
to litigate her rights by challenging the present operation of the neutral
employment seniority system. Thus, Evans has the potential for abrogating
Title VII's statute of limitations in many situations. It is this potential effect
which has apparently caused the United States Supreme Court to grant
defendant United Air Lines' petition for certiorari. 18
In anticipation of the Court's review of the case, analysis of the Seventh
Circuit's reasoning in Evans is warranted. Before examining Evans itself,
however, this note will review the prior circuit courts of appeals cases which
considered the validity of challenges of employment seniority systems. The
United States Supreme Court decision in Franks v. Bowman Transportation
Co. 19 will also be discussed since Franks implicitly considered the validity of
such challenges and directly influenced the outcome of Evans. Finally, this
analysis of Evans will examine the potential and practical implications of the
decision.
TITLE VII's EFFECT UPON EMPLOYMENT SENIoRrrY SYSTEMS
Employment seniority systems have in the past been perceived by
13. 534 F.2d 1247 (7th Cir. 1976), rev'g 12 Fair Empl. Prac, Cas. 288 (7th Cir.), cert.
granted, 96 S. Ct. 308 (1976) (No. 76-333).
14. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
15. 534 F.2d at 1250-51.
16. Id. at 1250.
17. Prior to the 1972 amendments to Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(d) (1970) required that a
charge be filed with the EEOC within 90 days after the occurence of the alleged unlawful
employment practice. In 1972 the period for filing was extended to 180 days and the section
renumbered 2000e-5(e). Act of Mar. 24, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 4(a), 86 Stat. 103.
18. 96 S. Ct. 308 (1976) (No. 76-333).
19. 424 U.S. 747 (1976) (Burger, C.J., Powell and Rehnquist, J.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
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several circuits 20 to be exempt from the strictures of Title VII under section
703(h) of the Act. 21 That provision seemingly authorized application of
different standards and terms of employment through a bona fide seniority
system. It was reasoned that a seniority system which measured all employ-
ees' seniority from their date of hire was neutral and non-discriminatory.
Such a neutral system thereby qualified as bona fide and was thus within the
terms of section 703(h) and insulated from suit.
22
A leading case holding that employment seniority systems were pro-
tected by section 703(h) was the Seventh Circuit's decision in Waters v.
Wisconsin Steel Works .23 In Waters, the court was faced with the contention
that defendant's "last hired, first fired" seniority system for bricklayers
violated Title VII because it perpetutated past, pre-Act discriminatory hiring
policies. The plaintiff,24 a black bricklayer, argued that blacks were laid off
before, and recalled after, certain whites who might not otherwise have had
seniority had Wisconsin Steel not discriminated in hiring. It was plaintiff's
contention that the facially neutral seniority procedures perpetuated the
effects of defendant's earlier discriminatory failure to hire blacks. The court
agreed that Wisconsin Steel had previously discriminated in its hiring
policies. Nevertheless, the court held that an employment seniority system
which was racially neutral on its face was a bona fide seniority system within
the contemplation of section 703(h) and therefore could not be violative of
Title VII.
25
20. See note 12 supra.
21. Section 703(h) of Title VII provides in pertinent part:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer to apply different standards of compensation, or
different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide
seniority or merit system. . . provided that such differences are not the result of an
intention to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin ....
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970 & Supp. IV 1974).
Included in the scant legislative history of § 703(h) are three interpretive memoranda
introduced into the Congressional Record by Senators Clark of Pennsylvania and Case of New
Jersey, the bipartisan managers of Title VII. The three memoranda are a Department of Justice
interpretive memorandum obtained by Senator Clark, an interpretive memorandum submitted by
the two senators, and Senator Clark's written response to a question of Senator Dirksen, one of
the floor managers for the bill. The memoranda state that Title VII, because its effect is
prospective and not retrospective, would not affect existing seniority rights. Thus, for example, a
white worker would not be permitted to be fired in order to hire a black worker, nor would a black
be allowed special seniority rights at the expense of an earlier hired white employee. A black,
according to the memoranda, could be fired pursuant to a "last hired, first fired" system as long
Ias it is done because of his status as 'last hired' and not because of his race." 110 CoNG. REC.
7207, 7212-15, 7216-17 (1964). See generally Vass, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. INDUS. &
COM. L. REV. 431 (1966).
22. See Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works, 502 F.2d 1309, 1318, 1320 (7th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 96 S. Ct. 2214 (1976).
23. 502 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1974).
24. Although the discussion here concerns the plaintiff Waters, another plaintiff Samuels,
alleged a discriminatory failure to hire. Id. at 1312.
25. Id. at 1318. Plaintiffs Waters and Samuels also challenged two amendatory agreements
to their collective bargaining contract. The agreements reinstated the contractual seniority recall
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The Fifth Circuit held similarly in Watkins v. United Steel Workers
Local 2369.26 Class action plaintiffs in Watkins were black employees who
were laid off under a last hired, first fired employment seniority system and
placed on a recall list in reverse seniority order. The employer had discrimi-
nated in hiring prior to, but not after, the effective date of Title VII. Plaintiffs
were hired under post-Act, non-discriminatory hiring practices. Neverthe-
less, as a result of the seniority system, all of the black employees hired after
1965, among others, were laid off and the first 138 persons on the recall list
were white.27 Plaintiffs challenged the layoff and recall procedures of the
employer which operated to exclude blacks from the work force.
28
The Fifth Circuit held that because plaintiffs themselves had not been
personally subjected to prior employment discrimination, the use of the
seniority system for layoff and recall was not violative of Title VII. 29 The
court added in dicta that even if the system could be found discriminatory, it
would be exempt under section 703(h) from being declared an unlawful
employment practice.
30
In contrast to Waters and Watkins, the Second Circuit in Acha v.
Beame3l considered section 703(h) inapplicable to a challenge based on the
rights of three white employees, after the white employees had received severance pay in lieu of
the right of recall. Thus, the white employees were put back on the seniority list for recall ahead
of plaintiffs. The court found the amendatory agreements discriminatory with respect to Waters.
The court stated further that the prior discriminatory hiring practices and implementation of their
present employment seniority system placed defendant at the brink of present discrimination.
The amendatory agreements were not discriminatory as to Samuels, an inexperienced worker,
the court agreeing with the policy of favoring recall of an experienced former worker before
considering new applicants. Id. at 1320-21.
26. 516 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1975).
27. Id. at 43-44.
28. Id. Plaintiffs also brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1981(1970). The court, which found no
Title VII violation, stated that the § 1981 claim was consequently dismissed. 516 F.2d at 50.
29. 516 F.2d at 44-45.
30. Id. at 46. Accord, Jersey Central Power & Light Co. v. Local 327, IBEW, 508 F.2d 687
(3d Cir. 1975), vacatedandremandedsub nom. EEOC v. Jersey Central Power& Light Co., 96 S.
Ct. 2196 (1976). In Jersey Central, the Third Circuit reviewed a declaratory judgment which
determined for an employer which of two procedures should govern layoffs: a collective
bargaining agreement requiring layoffs in reverse order of seniority or a conciliation agreement
with the EEOC to retain more minority and female workers. The court held both agreements to be
consistent, since the objective of the conciliation agreement, to increase the percentage of female
and minority group persons among employees, was to be attained by the hiring of a greater
percentage of those persons and not by readjustment of seniority or layoff procedures. Thus, as
the court interpreted the agreements, once the females and minority group persons were hired
according to the conciliation agreement, they would be subject to the conditions of employment,
including seniority terms, as embodied in the collective bargaining agreement. 508 F.2d at 701-03.
The court then considered whether reverse seniority layoffs which disproportionately affected
minorities and females were contrary to public policy. Finding no statutory proscription of
employment seniority systems, the court determined that § 703(h) authorized the use of bona fide
seniority systems, regardless of any perpetuating effect they might have. The court concluded
also that because the neutral employment seniority system was exempt from suit, the court was
not empowered to remedy the present effects of the prior discrimination. Id.
31. 531 F.2d 648 (2d Cir. 1976).
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operation of an employment seniority system which perpetuated prior dis-
crimination. In Acha, the plaintiffs represented a class of female police
officers in New York City who were laid off under a last hired, first fired
policy. Females had previously been discriminated against in hiring and,
when layoffs were made, many more females than males were affected since
the women had been hired only recently. Plaintiffs contended the layoffs
perpetuated the past discriminatory hiring policies of the police department
and sought constructive seniority to the date they would have been hired but
for the discrimination.
32
The Second Circuit held that the layoffs under the facially neutral
seniority system were not insulated from attack under section 703(h). 33 The
court determined that the seniority system, because it perpetutated past
discrimination as to plaintiffs, could not be bona fide and fell outside the
terms of section 703(h). Moreover, the seniority system could not be
considered bona fide until that past discrimination was remedied by granting
the plaintiffs the seniority to which they were entitled. 34
The United States Supreme Court clarified the meaning of section 703(h)
and its effect on employment seniority systems in Franks v. Bowman
Transportation Co. 35 However, Franks did not involve a challenge based
upon such a seniority system but a remedies question under Title VII. The
Court held that section 703(h) does not bar an award of retroactive seniority to
employees who were previously discriminatorily refused employment.
36
The issue in Franks was presented in a suit by a class of black petitioners
who were applicants of the defendant trucking company. Plaintiffs had been
discriminatorily refused positions as over-the-road truck drivers and sought
32. Id. at 650, 654.
33. Id. at 651-52. The Second Circuit had previously not allowed § 703(h) to insulate a
departmental seniority system from alteration where the system was based on past discrimina-
tory classifications in United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652 (2d Cir. 1971). Thus,
the court concluded in Acha that the section could not insulate the employment seniority system
in Acha since there was no sufficient basis for distinguishing between facially neutral departmen-
tal and employment seniority systems. The court in Acha did point out that in an employment
seniority case, unlike the departmental system in Bethlehem Steel, an award of constructive
seniority would not invalidate or alter the seniority system, but merely would put plaintiffs in
their proper place in it. 531 F.2d at 652, 655.
34. 531 F.2d at 655. The Second Circuit relied on its prior decision in Chance v. Board of
Examiners, 534 F.2d 993 (2d Cir. 1976), in its advocacy of retroactive seniority. In Chance,
minority workers had been kept from their rightful place on the seniority list through inability to
pass an allegedly discriminatory examination. The court stated that such a plaintiff "may in some
instances be entitled to preferential treatment-not because he is black, but because, and only to
the extent that, he has been discriminated against." A grant of constructive seniority, the court in
Chance stated, would put minority employees in the approximate spot on the seniority list they
would have occupied but for the discrimination. Id. at 999.
35. 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
36. Id. at 761-62.
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an award of constructive seniority from the date of the refusals.37 When the
case was before the Fifth Circuit, that court held that the company's neutral
seniority system was bona fide and that the prior discrimination in hiring did
not affect the bona fides of the system. 38 The court prohibited the extension of
constructive seniority as a remedy by reasoning that section 703(h) protected
bona fide seniority systems from any interference or alteration.
39
The Court reversed the appellate court and pointed out that the legal
wrong affecting the black applicants was not a racially discriminatory
seniority system but a racially discriminatory hiring system. 0 The petitioners
did not seek alteration or elimination of the seniority system but simply an
award of the seniority status they would have had were it not for the
discriminatory refusal to hire. Thus, the Court determined the effect of
section 703(h) upon that claim:
[W]hatever the exact meaning and scope of section 703(h). . . the
thrust of the section is directed toward defining what is and what is
not an illegal discriminatory practice in instances in which the
post-Act operation of a seniority system is challenged as perpetuat-
ing the effects of discrimination occurring prior to the effective
date of the Act. There is no indication in the legislative materials
that section 703(h) was intended to modify or restrict relief other-
wise appropriate once an illegal discriminatory practice occurring
after the effective date of the Act is proved-as in the instant case,
a discriminatory refusal to hire.41
37. Suit was brought under Title VII and under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970). Plaintiff Franks had
made an individual claim of discrimination but the district court dismissed it as barred by the
limitations period. The Fifth Circuit reversed that portion of the decision, however, and re-
manded Franks' claim for re-determination. 495 F.2d at 398,406. In the meantime, plaintiff Lee
intervened to press his individual claim against Bowman following his allegedly discriminatory
discharge and to represent other classes of black Bowman employees and job applicants. Id. at
406-07.
38. 495 F.2d at 417. Another portion of the class were employees who were affected by the
maintenance of defendant's departmental seniority system. The court of appeals found that
Bowman had, prior to 1968, consciously segregated its departments according to race by
employing blacks only in the most menial and lowest paying jobs in one particular department.
Interdepartmental transfers were flatly prohibited until 1967 when a collective bargaining
agreement eliminated the no-transfer policy and allowed for nondiscriminatory hiring in all
departments. The agreement, however, continued to recognize departmental seniority which, the
court found, favored whites over blacks desiring transfer. Id. at 410-11. In addition, management
blatantly discouraged transfer, job openings were often posted only in the departments where
they occurred so that other employees remained ignorant of them, and the defendant continued to
hire only whites in certain jobs. Id. at 411. The court asserted that to release employees from old
racial patterns of the departmental seniority system, use of full company seniority was required
for transfer purposes. Id. at 416.
39. Id. at 417. But cf. Meadows v. Ford Motor Co., 570 F.2d 939 (6th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 96 S. Ct. 2215 (1976) (no prohibition found in the Act of a remedy of retroactive seniority).
40. 424 U.S. at 758.
41. Id. at 761. The Court also discussed the appropriateness of an award of retroactive
seniority under the § 706(g) remedial provision of Title VII. The Court asserted "that ordinarily
such relief will be necessary to achieve the 'make whole' purposes of the Act." Id. at 766. The
Court stated that an award of seniority status is not requisite in every case, but, citing its decision
in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975), asserted:
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
The Court's precise holding makes clear that section 703(h) is not
relevant in determining what relief is available when discrimination is found
under the Act. It may be inferred from the Court's reasoning that the scope of
section 703(h) is limited to seniority systems alleged to perpetuate pre-Act
discrimination. Accordingly, section 703(h) does not serve as a general
exemption of employment seniority systems from suit. As such, the reason-
ings of Waters and Watkins concerning exemptions of such systems from
suit are weakened.
Recognizing the limited scope of section 703(h) is not conclusive in
determining the validity of a challenge to the operation of an employment
seniority system. It merely eliminates what once was considered an authoriza-
tion of such systems. The Seventh Circuit in Evans, however, chose to go
beyond this precise holding of Franks and rely upon the Court's general
discussion of employment seniority systems and Title VII objectives to
sustain a challenge to the operation of an employment seniority system.
Because of the factual context in which the Seventh Circuit reached its
conclusion, the decision manifests new uncertainties under Title VII. Particu-
larly troubling is the decision's potential impact upon application of the Act's
statute of limitations and its construction of a continuing violation under the
Act.
Evans v. United Air Lines, Inc.
Plaintiff in Evans was a flight attendant for the defendant United Air
Lines. She worked from 1966 to 1968 when, planning to marry, she
involuntarily resigned pursuant to defendant's then-existing no-marriage rule
for female flight attendants. In February 1972, after United's no-marriage
policy was found discriminatory, 42 plaintiff was rehired as a flight atten-
dant.4 3 Plaintiff's seniority began accruing from the date of her rehire,
No less than with the denial of the remedy of backpay, the denial of seniority relief to
victims of illegal racial discrimination in hiring is permissible 'only for reasons which,
if applied generally, would not frustrate the central statutory purposes of eradicating
discrimination throughout the economy and making persons whole for injuries suf-
fered through past discrimination.'
424 U.S. at 771. In its determination of this aspect of the case, the Court analogized to the
remedial section of the National Labor Relations Act, § 10(c), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1970), the model
for § 706(g) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1970). The NLRA allows, to those who have been
discriminatorily refused employment, seniority retroactive to the date of the discriminatory
refusal. This remedy would, of course, be just as appropriate for victims of discriminatory
discharge. 424 U.S. at 768-69.
42. Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991
(1971). Defendant's no-marriage policy was held unlawfully discriminatory as to sex because
female flight attendants were required to resign or transfer to a ground position upon marriage but
male flight attendants were under no such restriction. Id. at 1198. Defendant discontinued its
no-marriage policy on November 7, 1968. 534 F.2d 1247, 1247-48 (7th Cir. 1976).
43. By a letter of agreement with the flight attendants' collective bargaining agent in
November 1968, defendant United agreed to reinstate those stewardesses who had been
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according to defendant's policy of crediting toward seniority only continuous
time-in-service. Plaintiff Evans sued United in February 1973, basing her
charges on defendant's facially neutral seniority policy.' She claimed the
policy discriminated against her by failing to credit her for prior time worked
for which she would have received credit but for the discriminatory dis-
charge. 45 Plaintiff thus sought to apply to a neutral employment seniority
system the "present perpetuation" theory commonly applied to departmental
seniority systems.
Although Title VII provides a limitations period for filing discrimination
charges, 46 plaintiff in Evans did not bring suit until five years after her
no-marriage termination and one year after her rehire. Plaintiff contended that
the present practice of crediting her with "improper" seniority was a
"continuing" violation because of the ongoing effect upon her and that she
was not barred by the then ninety-day limitations period because charges
could be filed at any time during the pendency of a continuing violation.47
The Seventh Circuit ultimately agreed with plaintiff's arguments, but
only after rehearing the case in light of Franks .48 Initially, the court of appeals
affirmed49 the district court's dismissal of the complaint because of plaintiff's
failure to timely file charges.5" The appellate court viewed defendant's
terminated under the no-marriage rule and had filed charges with a governmental agency or
grievance under their collective bargaining agreement. Plaintiff had done neither and so did not
qualify for reinstatement. In October 1969, defendant agreed to reinstate those flight attendants
who had transferred to ground positions because of the no-marriage rule and who were then
employed by defendant. Again plaintiff did not qualify. 534 F.2d at 1247-48.
44. Though defendant's policy of crediting only continuous time-in-service works to the
disadvantage of rehired employees, the court found it neutral as between male and female
employees. Id. at 1249.
45. Specifically, plaintiff's theory was as follows: defendant's present practice was to
credit her with less seniority than male flight attendants hired between 1966 and 1972 and males
with the same or less time in service. The present disparity in seniority was caused by prior sex
discrimination, her no-marriage termination. Consequently, defendant's current practice with
respect to plaintiff's deficient seniority presently and continuously discriminated against her.
Brief for Appellant at 3-4, Evans v. United Air Lines, Inc., 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 288 (7th Cir.
1976).
46. See note 17 supra.
47. Where a party alleges the existence of an allegedly discriminatory employment practice
which is continuing in nature and effect, the time limit is inapplicable since obviously there is no
single date from which the period might begin to run. Bartmess v. Drewrys U.S.A., Inc., 444 F.2d
1186, 1188 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 939 (1971); see also Healen v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 8
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 917 (N.D.Ga. 1973) (continuing violation by denial of seniority); Tippett v.
Liggett & Meyers Tobacco Co., 316 F. Supp. 292 (M.D.N.C. 1970) (continuing violation by
failure to credit past work time).
48. Evans v. United Air Lines, Inc., 534 F.2d 1247 (7th Cir. 1976). The case was decided by
Circuit Judges Cummings and Sprecher and Judge Adams from the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit, sitting by designation.
49. 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 288 (7th Cir. 1976) [hereinafter referred to in the text as Evans
I].
50. 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 287 (N.D. Ill. 1975). Judge Bernard Decker, ina memorandum
opinion, granted defendant's motion for dismissal. The motion was based on the ground that the
court was without jurisdiction under Title VII because plaintiff had failed to file charges with the
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neutral employment seniority system as bona fide and therefore not unlawful
under Title VII. The only remaining basis for suit, then, was plaintiff's
discriminatory, no-marriage termination in 1968. A charge brought in 1973
based on that act, the court concluded, was obviously time-barred since it was
not filed within the then ninety-day time limit.5
In Evans I, the court of appeals looked to both a Ninth Circuit decision
and to the Seventh Circuit's decision in Waters for support. The Ninth Circuit
in Collins v. United Air Lines, Inc. 52 disallowed a Title VII claim by a
discriminatorily terminated flight attendant brought four years after her
discharge. Plaintiff Collins was involuntarily terminated under defendant's
then-existing no-marriage rule and was subsequently refused rehire. Plaintiff
claimed that defendant's refusal to reinstate her deprived her of the benefits of
employment and was thus a continuing violation and not barred by the Act's
time limit. The Ninth Circuit rejected this theory and concluded instead that
plaintiff's nonemployment was merely an effect of an unlawful practice.
5 3
Thus, the filing of charges had to have occurred within ninety days of her
unlawful discharge. 54 The court also concluded that defendant's refusal to
reinstate plaintiff was not a new act of discrimination; rather, plaintiff's
request for reinstatement was merely an attempt to remedy the discharge.
55
The Ninth Circuit labeled plaintiff's nonemployment merely an "ef-
fect" of her no-marriage termination and not a continuing violation. The
Seventh Circuit followed this approach in Evans I and characterized Evans'
present deprivation of benefits under the seniority system as merely an
"effect" of the prior discriminatory discharge. 56 In denying the challenge,
EEOC within the proper time limit. The court found that Evans' seniority was lost by reason of
her February 1968 resignation and that she therefore should have filed charges within 90 days
from that unlawful employment practice. See note 17 supra. Before the filing of this charge,
plaintiff had not filed any prior charge of discrimination with the EEOC or any other governmen-
tal agency in challenge to defendant's no-marriage rule or her discharge.
51. Most courts have found the timely filing of charges to be jurisdictional. E.g., East v.
Romine, 518 F.2d 332, 336 (5th Cir. 1975); Choate v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 402 F.2d 357, 359
(7th Cir. 1968).
52. 514 F.2d 594 (9th Cir. 1975).
53. Id. at 596.
54. Id.
55. Id. In Evans I, Judge Cummings noted that the plaintiff in Collins had failed to show
that the "proximate cause" of defendant's refusal to reinstate her was the prior discrimination.
12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 292. Accord, Stroud v. Delta Airlines, 392 F. Supp. 1184 (N.D. Ga.
1975), aff'd, 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 206 (5th Cir. 1977). Plaintiff in Stroud was terminated under
a no-marriage rule and twice refused rehire. Upon her claim of a continuing violation, the court
held that plaintiff must show that the refusals to reinstate were based on discriminatory animus
flowing from prior policies or that the refusals were otherwise discriminatory in themselves. Id.
at 1193.
56. 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 290. Judge Cummings dissented in Evans I. He agreed with
plaintiff's assertion that the operation of defendant's seniority system which failed to credit her
with seniority, for time worked until her discriminatory termination, was a current and continuing
act of discrimination. Id. at 292.
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the court in Evans I did not explicitly state that defendant's neutral employ-
ment seniority system was protected from suit under section 703(h). How-
ever, the court relied on Waters and thereby implicitly considered the
seniority system to be protected under that provision.
57
Evaluating plaintiff's claim on rehearing, the Seventh Circuit looked to
the United States Supreme Court's decision in Franks decided after Evans I,
to hold that an employment seniority system is not protected from suit by
section 703(h).58 Following Franks, the court of appeals acknowledged that
section 703(h) is a narrow exception to Title VII's prohibition of all dis-
criminatory employment practices and that the section is pertinent only where
a pre-Act discrimination situation exists. 59 The court was thus free to apply
the theory that a neutral employment policy may be discriminatory if it gives
present effect to past discrimination:
United's continuous time-in-service seniority program may put an
employee who has been discharged and later rehired into an inferior
seniority position. . . . If the prior discharge was itself a dis-
criminatory one, then United's seniority policy is an instrument
that extends the impact of past discrimination, albeit unintentional-
ly. Consequently, the present application of United's seniority
policy is deemed to be discriminatory.6
The Seventh Circuit concluded that "Evans' complaint, having been filed
during the pendency of the alleged discrimination, was not time-barred. "61
The court thereby construed the discriminatory operation of the seniority
system as a continuing violation and found that plaintiff's filing of charges
one year after her rehire was not untimely.
Evans cited the Second Circuit decision in Acha 62 as supportive of its
holding. Although Acha is similar to Evans in principle, it has important
factual distinctions. In Acha the initial discriminatory act was the refusal to
hire female police officers. The alleged perpetuation of this earlier dis-
criminatory act was the present layoff of the female officers who were at the
bottom of the employment seniority system. 63 The court found that if the
individual plaintiffs could show that they were initially refused hire because
of their sex, then their present layoff due to lack of sufficient seniority
violated Title VII and section 703(h) would not bar suit. 4 Thus, while Acha
is persuasive authority for the Evans holding, it must be made clear that the
layoffs in Acha involved a present affirmative act by the employer which
57. Id. at 291.
58. 534 F.2d at 1251.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1247.
61. Id. at 1251.
62. See text accompanying notes 31, 34 supra.
63. 531 F.2d at 650.
64. Id. at 654.
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perpetuated the prior discriminatory practice. Evans, on the other hand,
involved an employer's failure to act; specifically, the failure to credit past
seniority. This distinction may prove fateful for Evans.65
The Seventh Circuit also sought support in the often-cited 1971 United
States Supreme Court decision in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 66 In Griggs the
Court held that neutral employment testing procedures and diploma require-
ments may be violative of Title VII if they are not job-related and operate to
maintain the status quo of prior discriminatory practices. 67 Accordingly,
Griggs affirmed the use of the perpetuation theory as then applied in
departmental seniority system cases. 68 By relying on Griggs, the Seventh
Circuit adhered to established Title VII case law holding neutral practices
unlawful if they perpetuate past discrimination. The novelty in Evans is the
application of this principle to a neutral employment seniority system. To
justify its extension of the principle, the court in Evans apparently regarded as
significant certain language of the Court in Franks which went beyond the
Court's section 703(h) resolution.
The Court, in considering the remedy of retroactive seniority in Franks,
stated that one who is not granted proper seniority credit "will perpetually
remain subordinate to persons who, but for the illegal discrimination would
have been in respect to entitlements to these benefits his inferiors." 69 The
Court thereby premised its advocacy of a remedy of retroactive seniority upon
the recognition that an employee without proper seniority may be in a
perpetually subordinate position. In addition, the Court reiterated Title VII's
"make whole" purpose and its intent to prohibit all practices which create
inequality in employment opportunity.70 Despite its appreciation of the
underlying issues, however, the Court did not actually determine whether a
subordinate employee has a valid cause of action based upon inferior status
within the seniority system. Nevertheless, considering the Court's dicta, it
was not unreasonable for the Seventh Circuit in Evans to infer that an
individual in a neutral seniority system may have a basis for suit if placed in an
inferior position because of prior discrimination.
65. See text accompanying notes 84-93 infra.
66. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
67. The Court held:
Under the Act, practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and even neutral in
terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they operate to "freeze" the status quo of prior
discriminatory employment practices.
The Act proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in
form, but discriminatory in operation.
Id. at 423, 430-31. The Court concluded that testing procedures and diploma requirements which
operated to exclude blacks, and proven not to be job related, would be prohibited. Id. at 431.
68. Note, The Problem of Last Hired, First Fired: Retroactive Seniority As a Remedy Under
Title VII, 9 GA. L. REv. 611, 628 (1975).
69. 424 U.S. at 768.
70. Id. at 774.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
In sum, the Seventh Circuit in Evans considered a claim of discrimina-
tion to be timely when filed during the operation of a seniority policy which
carried forward some effects of a prior, time-barred act of discrimination.
This decision found the limitations period inapplicable as to the original
discrimination. Moreover, characterization of the present seniority practice
as a continuing violation tolled the statute of limitations because charges can
be filed at any time during which a continuing violation exists. Thus, the
result in Evans poses significant potential consequences which deserve
examination.
IMPLICATIONS OF Evans
Title VII's Statute of Limitations
According to Evans, an employment seniority system may perpetuate
past discrimination, and do so in a continuing manner, by the failure to credit
an employee with "proper" seniority.7" The discrimination in Evans that was
presumably perpetuated was the plaintiff's no-marriage termination. How-
ever, charges based on that discriminatory discharge were long since time-
barred when plaintiff brought her current suit. Despite the fact that the
limitations period had run as to her no-marriage termination, plaintiff sought
an additional opportunity to litigate her rights by challenging the present
operation of the seniority system.
Considering, for a moment, only Evans' discriminatory termination, it is
clear that charges had to have been brought within the then ninety-day time
limit. Since termination is commonly considered a single act, all discrimina-
tion charges are required to be brought within the proper time limit from the
date of the termination.72 The Ninth Circuit in Collins concluded as much by
disallowing a claim brought four years after an unlawful, no-marriage
termination. 73 Similarly, in Evans there was a discriminatory discharge that
was not challenged within the statutory limitations period. However, an
anomaly is created between Evans and Collins because the plaintiff in Evans
was rehired. Thus, the plaintiff in Evans was permitted to avoid the statute of
limitations by asserting that her deficient seniority was a present violation. In
short, the employee who is rehired may completely avoid the limitations
71. 534 F.2d at 1250.
72. See, e.g., Terry v. Bridgeport Brass Co., 519 F.2d 806,808 (7th Cir. 1975). The Seventh
Circuit noted that when an employee resigns or is terminated, all charges of discrimination must
be filed in relation to the date of discharge. In Terry, however, after plaintiffs were terminated
they had no subsequent employment contact with their former employer. Thus, the filing of
charges eleven months after the terminations was held untimely. Id. at 808. See also Olson v.
Rembrandt Printing Co., 511 F.2d 1228, 1234 (8th Cir. 1975) (en banc) (termination of employ-
ment is not continuing violation even though the continuing discrimination theory may be
available to present employees).
73. See text accompanying note 52 supra.
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period as to the prior discriminatory discharge, while the employee who is not
rehired must abide by it.
A New York district court addressed this point in a case similar to Evans
but which reached a different result. In Cates v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. ,74
the district court asserted that if a neutral seniority system were found to
perpetuate some past discrimination, the Act's limitations period would be
eradicated. 75 Thus, the court stated:
Carried to its logical result, such an evasion of the statutory
limitations of time would permit those whose only claim is they
were hired later than they should have been, to bring their claims to
the EEOC anytime they chose, while those who were refused hire
altogether would still face the bar of the statutory cut-off date.76
A California district court also recently addressed this anomaly in a case
strikingly similar to Evans. In Kennan v. Pan American World Airways,
Inc. ,7 plaintiffs who became pregnant were terminated according to the
defendant's policy. After the defendant eliminated the discriminatory rule,
the plaintiffs were reinstated. Although suit based on the pregnancy dis-
charges was time-barred, the employees brought suit based on the present
operation of the neutral employment seniority system which denied them
credit for service prior to the discharges. Considering the limitations period as
to the earlier discriminatory discharges, the court asserted: "Because there is
little or no visible prejudice to Pan Am by virtue of the lapse of time since its
original act of discrimination, defendant's need for statute of limitations
protection is minimized here." 78 The court concluded that for purposes of
74. 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 201 (S.D.N.Y. July 22, 1976), appeal argued, No. 76-7420 (2d
Cir. March 3, 1976).
75. Id. at 207.
76. Id. at 207-08. In Cates, three black plaintiffs alleged Title VII claims. Plaintiffs Cates
and George charged they were repeatedly denied employment by defendant because of race from
1966 until each was finally hired in 1969. The following year both were furloughed. The third
plaintiff, Whitehead, began working for defendant in 1967. He claimed he had been interested in
working for TWA in 1957 but because he knew of defendant's discriminatory policy toward
blacks he did not apply. His main claim was that because of defendant's discriminatory policy
which dissuaded him from applying earlier, he lost seniority benefits. Id. at 203. The district court
held that as to the allegedly discriminatory layoffs of Cates and George, the time period for filing
should commence running from the date of layoff for reasons of certainty and predictability.
Plaintiffs did not meet this requirement and were therefore time-barred. Id. at.208. Whitehead's
claim was also denied when the court declared that the monthly allocation of benefits.pursuant to
a facially neutral employment seniority system was not an unlawful practice which commenced
the limitations period. The court cited Collins to hold that any detriments currently suffered were
not of themselves fresh acts of discrimination but only derivative effects of the prior discrimina-
tion, namely, TWA's alleged discriminatory hiring policies. A claim based on those policies
should have been filed, the court concluded, within the statutory time limit from the effective
date of Title VII. Id. at 209.
77. 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1530 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 1976).
78. Id. at 1534.
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determining the discriminatory operation of the seniority system, the plain-
tiffs' original terminations did not commence the limitations period.79
Employers themselves may attempt to avoid the potential problem raised
by Evans by simply refusing to hire or rehire individuals against whom they
have previously discriminated, whether by discharge or failure to hire. The
Seventh Circuit itself noted that the result reached in Evans would discourage
the rehiring of employees. 8° The district court in Kennan agreed when it
stated that although its decision might discourage the rehiring of employees,
Title VII's make-whole objectives made the legal result worth the risk.81
It is arguable that Evans would not discourage rehire because to refuse
employment for reasons stemming from the prior discrimination because of
fear of legal repercussions and economic effects could itself be discrimina-
tory.8 2 This argument leads to a dilemma for the employer. Faced with a job
application from an employee previously discriminated against, the employer
may either refuse employment and possibly face suit for that refusal or hire the
individual and also face suit if the seniority system somehow carries forward
the prior discrimination, as in Evans.
Kennan noted that the original discrimination was not the focus of the
present lawsuit, but that the focus was the reinstatement without back
seniority.83 This assertion points out the desire of plaintiffs to prevent the
arguments and defenses from centering around the earlier time-barred dis-
crimination. In Evans this desire was satisfied. The court in Evans conceded
that a charge based solely on the discriminatory discharge was untimely.
However, by focusing instead on the present seniority practice, the court was
able to find a current violation. Thus, the court held that the present effects of
the prior discrimination were a continuing violation and therefore not time-
barred. This characterization itself raises additional uncertainties.
The Concept of a Continuing Violation
In Evans, the deprivation of seniority and benefits was held to be a
continuing violation because of the ongoing operation of the seniority system
and its effect on the plaintiff. Plaintiff's lesser benefits under the system
carried the past discrimination continuously, every day, into the present. The
consequence of characterizing a violation as continuing is to toll the Act's
statute of limitations and thus create an extraordinary opportunity to bring
discrimination charges. 
84
79. Id. at 1534-35.
80. Evans v. United Air Lines, Inc., 12 Fair Empi. Prac. Cas. 288, 290 n.5 (7th Cir. 1976).
81. 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 1534.
82. See note 55 supra.
83. 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 1534.
84. E.g., Rich v. Martin Marietta Corp., 522 F.2d 333 (10th Cir. 1975); Bartmess v. Drewrys
U.S.A., Inc., 444 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 939 (1971); Healen v. Eastern
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The concept of a continuing violation is well-recognized. 85 But simply
labeling an act or practice as "continuing" because its effects are continuous-
ly felt is not determinative. The proper role of the courts when faced with the
parties' various characterizations of the claims is to interpret their propriety as
they relate to the limitations period. The court in Evans has taken a broad
view of the concept of a continuing violation. Thus, if an employee like the
plaintiff in Evans may bring suit one year after her rehire because the seniority
system gives effect to a prior discriminatory discharge, then she should be
able to bring suit ten or twenty years after her rehire because her benefits will
always and continuously be slightly less than they should be. Seeking to avoid
this extreme result, other courts have taken a different view of the concept of a
continuing violation.
In Cates,86 the black plaintiff claimed that the operation of a seniority
system deprived him of benefits which would have been his but for the prior
alleged discrimination in hiring. The court denied his claim by declaring that
the monthly allocation of benefits pursuant to a facially neutral employment
seniority system was not a present unlawful practice which commenced the
limitations period or which was a continuing violation. 87 The court held
instead that any detriments currently suffered were not of themselves fresh
acts of discrimination but only derivative effects of the prior alleged discrimi-
nation, namely, defendant's alleged discriminatory hiring policies.
88
A Texas district court also imposed restrictions when faced with a
discrimination charge based on a refusal by an employer to restore plaintiff's
seniority rights. The plaintiff in Kennedy v. Branniff Airways, Inc. 89 was
rehired after a no-marriage termination. The court stated that even if it
accepted the refusal to restore plaintiff's seniority .' hts as discriminatory,
plaintiff should have filed charges upon resumption of her flight position
because she must have then been put on notice of defendant's seniority
policies.
9°
Similarly, the district court in Kennan was faced with claims of a
continuing violation by the operation of an employment seniority system as to
rehired employees.91 Although the court supported the broad concept of a
continuing violation, it still sought to apply the statute of limitation, stating
that "a 'statute of limitations' which never tolls [sic] would be a statute
Airlines, Inc., 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 917 (N.D. Ga. 1973); Tippett v. Liggett & Meyers Tobacco
Co., 316 F. Supp. 292 (M.D.N.C. 1970).
85. See note 84 supra.
86. See text accompanying notes 74-76 supra.
87. 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 209.
88. Id.
89. 403 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Tex. 1975).
90. Id. at 709-10. See also Keller v. Braniff Int'l Airlines, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 537 (N.D. Tex.
1975).
91. 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 1531.
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judicially overruled. "92 The court cited both Cates and Kennedy but ulti-
mately found the Cates reasoning persuasive. The court stated that neither the
date of rehire, nor the routine operation of a seniority system, should
commence the limitations period, but that the occurrence of an event, such as
transfer or layoff, must control the commencement of the limitations period. 93
The decisions of these three courts exemplify different approaches
toward clarifying the continuing violation concept as applied to employment
seniority systems. Obviously, the situation remains nebulous. The courts'
views differ as to precisely when a continuing violation exists, how the
concept pertains to the routine operation of an employment seniority system,
and how the Act's statute of limitations applies.
Despite this general uncertainty, a definite consequence of the broad
view of a continuing violation taken in Evans is the ever-present potential for
suit. Such a situation seems contrary to the purposes intended by the
imposition of a time limit in which to bring suit. Implicit in limitations periods
is the refusal to allow persons to "sleep on their rights. "I That implication is
condemning for the plaintiff in Evans because she did not bring suit either at
the time of her discriminatory, no-marriage termination, or upon her rehiring
when she received her new seniority date and was not credited with her prior
time in service.
Validity of the Perpetuation Theory as Applied in Evans
In any view of Evans, the underlying wrong from which all effects
emanated was Evans' 1968 no-marriage termination. The only means by
92. Id. at 12.
93. Id. at 12-13. A New Jersey district court recently supported this reasoning in Turnow v.
Eastern Airlines, Inc., 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1227 (D.N.J. Sept. 28, 1976). There, plaintiff was
terminated by the airline because of pregnancy and rehired several years later. Shortly after her
rehire, plaintiff was furloughed due to her lack of seniority. She was recalled ten months later.
Two months thereafter she filed a discrimination complaint. Plaintiff contended that the neutral
seniority system had the effect of carrying into the present defendant's past discrimination, and,
further, the violation was a continuing one. The court held that the latest date from which the
180-day limitations period could begin to run was the date of her furlough. Thus, the claim was
dismissed as time-barred. Id. at 1229. The court relied on Collins and Cates and deliberately
chose to disregard Evans. Id.
94. Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals Co., 421 F.2d 888,892 (5th Cir. 1970) (citing Burnett v.
New York Central R.R., 380 U.S. 424 (1965)). The Fifth Circuit in Culpepper, a case involving a
Title VII claim of discriminatory promotion, considered the United States Supreme Court's
language in Burnett, an FELA case, to have broad applicability:
Statutes of limitations are primarily designed to assure fairness to defendants. Such
statutes promote justice by preventing surprises through the revival of claims that have
been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and
witnesses have disappeared. The theory is that even if one has a just claim it is unjust
not to put the adversary on notice to defend within the period of limitation and that the
right to be free of stale claims in time comes to prevail over the right to prosecute
them. . . . Moreover, the courts ought to be relieved of the burden of trying stale
claims when a plaintiff has slept on his rights. This policy of repose, designed to protect
defendants, is frequently outweighed however, where the interests of justice require
vindication of the plaintiff's rights.
380 U.S. at 428.
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which a present violation could be found to exist was by application of the
theory that the seniority system perpetuated plaintiff's past discrimination.
This is the foundation of the "present perpetuation of past discrimination"
theory;95 that is, an apparently neutral practice in some way gives present
effect to past discrimination. However, the application of that theory to
employment seniority systems may not have a firm, logical basis.
A discriminatory departmental seniority system operates to keep certain
classes of employees in designated departments by interfering with transfers
and promotions. Making transfer costly in terms of seniority locks employees
in the designated departments and thus perpetuates an employer's past
segregation practices. But, it is crucial to note that regardless of any prior
discrimination by the employer, the "locking in" of employees under a
departmental seniority system creates a present disparity by denying job
opportunities to the "locked in" employees.96 This disparity and denial of job
opportunity create present actionable discrimination.97 In such a case, the
perpetuation theory is superfluous to a finding of present discrimination.
Generally, upon a finding of a discriminatory departmental seniority system,
the system itself is dismantled and employment seniority is imposed. 98
On the other hand, a plaintiff like Evans who challenges the operation of
an employment seniority system does not seek to eliminate the system.
Rather, she seeks her "rightful" place within the seniority system and claims
the system denies her that position because of prior discrimination. She can
establish that she is presently not in her rightful place and that there is present
disparity only by also establishing prior discrimination. Therefore, while an
employment seniority system may operate to "recognize" prior discrimina-
tion, it does not in itself create a present, actionable disparity as does a
departmental system. Instead, the only means by which an employment
seniority system may operate discriminatorily is with reference to a prior act
of discrimination.
99
95. See notes 6-9 and accompanying text supra.
96. See Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 495 F.2d 398,410-11(5th Cir. 1974), rev'd on other
grounds, 424 U.S. 747 (1976); Local 189, United Papermakers & Paperworkers v. United States,
416 F.2d 980, 988, 990 (5th Cir. 1%9), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970).
97. Local 189, United Papermakers & Paperworkers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980, 990
(5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970).
98. -See note 9 supra.
99. A Ninth Circuit decision, factually similar to Evans, also establishes this point. In
Griffin v. Pacific Maritime Assn., 478 F.2d 1118 (9th Cir. 1973), plaintiffs' union contract did not
credit them for service prior to their discriminatory discharges which occurred before the
enactment of Title VII. The court held that under Title VII plaintiffs had failed to exhaust proper
state remedies and dismissed their Title VII claim. However, as to their 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and
1985 claims, the court asserted that because plaintiffs could establish their claim only with
evidence as to what motivated their allegedly discriminatory discharges, the claims were barred
by time. Id. at 1120.
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CONCLUSION
Sustaining a challenge to the operation of a facially neutral employment
seniority system, as Evans did, is not simply a matter of applying established
Title VII case law. The theory that a neutral practice may give present effect to
past discrimination, and therefore be violative of Title VII, is logical and
acceptable only in certain situations. Evans is not a situation in which the
theory logically applies. In addition, the potential legal and practical effects
of the decision indicate that its significant consequences were not sufficiently
considered by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
Several serious implications flow from Evans. First, and perhaps the
most serious, is the abrogation of the Act's statute of limitations. The
limitations period may be avoided, according to Evans, when an employee
once discriminatorily discharged is, upon rehire, affected by that prior
discrimination through the operation of the employer's seniority system. The
rehired employee, by suing on the present practice, avoids the limitations
period for the earlier discrimination. Such a result makes the availability of
avoidance of the time limitation dependent upon being rehired. Thus, the
employee who is discriminatorily discharged and fails to timely file a
complaint has no remedy, while the employee so discharged who fails to
timely file but who is rehired has a remedy. This anomaly created by Evans
will certainly discourage voluntary conciliation and encourage an employer to
avoid any further relationship with such an employee.
A second troubling implication of Evans is the court's broadening of the
concept of a "continuing" violation which similarly appears to ineffectuate
the Act's limitations period. Rather than center its deliberations on the
time-barred discrimination, the Seventh Circuit in Evans focused on the
present, challenged seniority system. The court characterized the operation of
the seniority system as a "continuing" violation. Such a characterization
tolled the statute of limitations and allowed the plaintiff in Evans to properly
file suit at any time during which she was affected by the lesser seniority
benefits. Such a conclusion, in all likelihood, leaves the courtroom doors
open indefinitely.
Despite the consequences which may flow from Evans, the decision is
not an unnatural step in an enlargement of opportunity for employees to gain
relief under Title VII. Equal employment opportunity and elimination of all
forms of employment discrimination, including neutral practices discrimina-
tory in operation, are consistently expressed objectives of Title VII.
Nevertheless, attaining these objectives through the acceptance of Evans
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must be balanced against the decision's implications. The impending United
States Supreme Court review of Evans indicates that the proper balance may
not have been struck.
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